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Fact-Finding as a Peace Negotiation Tool-
The Mitchell Report and the Israeli-
Palestinian Peace Process
ARTHUR LENK*
I. INTRODUCTION
The peace process between the Israelis and the Palestinians
requires creative concepts for conflict resolution. The "Oslo"
process, which began as a series of discussions in Norway among
academia, created a full range of legal and social relations between
the Israelis and the Palestinians. 1 It used a range of differing
methods and creativity to deal with seemingly irreconcilable issues
between the parties. 2 The basic concept of the process was to begin
with the "easier" issues and then gradually build a trusting
* Arthur Lenk is an attorney in the Legal Adviser's Office in Israel's Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. He holds an LL.B. degree from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and is a
member of the Israel and New York Bars. He took part in Israel's contacts with the
Mitchell Committee. Opinions expressed in this article are his alone. The author wishes to
thank Alan Baker and Raphael Cohen-Almagor for their assistance and advice.
1. See DAVID MAKOVSKY, MAKING PEACE WITH THE PLO: THE RABIN
GOVERNMENT'S ROAD TO THE OSLO ACCORD 1-9 (Westview Press 1996).
2. See id at 139-142.
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relationship to tackle the most difficult points of conflict. 3 The
series of agreements, signed by Israel and the Palestine Liberation
Organization between 1993-1999, were not merely written
agreements. Rather, the agreements were steps in a process of
reconciliation and confidence building that would lead towards
addressing the most contentious issues.4 Despite the first genuine
attempt to deal with these permanent status issues at Camp David
in July 2000, violence erupted between the Israelis and the
Palestinians in September 2000.
5
In the days following these confrontations, the Israelis and the
Palestinians, together with the active involvement of the United
States and others (Egypt, Jordan, United Nations and the
European Union), began to consider additional methods of
conflict resolution to cease violence and return to a more
constructive path. 6 The parties involved decided to form a fact-
finding body to examine the facts and causes of the violent
outbreaks, and to propose ideas to prevent their recurrence. 7 The
idea to form such a body was first proposed at a summit in Paris on
October 4, 2000.8 The Israelis and the Palestinians reached an
agreement on the proposal at a second summit that took place in
Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt on October 16-17, 2000.9 Former U.S.
Senator George J. Mitchell chaired the Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-
Finding Committee (the Mitchell Committee). 10 In April 2001, the
Committee published the Mitchell Report, which summarized its
findings and recommendations."
3. MAKOVSKY, supra note 1, at 141. See Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-
Government Arrangements, Sept. 13, 1993, Israel-Palestine Liberation Organization, 32
I.L.M. 1525 (1993) [hereinafter Declaration of Principles].
4. See MAKOVSKY, supra note 1, at 141.
5. See SHARM EL-SHEIKH FACT-FINDING COMMITTEE, REPORT OF THE SHARM
EL-SHEIKH FACT-FINDING COMMITTEE 10-11, Doc. SN 3552/01 (2001) (available from
Meridian International Center, 1624 Crescent Place, N.W., Wash., D.C. 20009 or
www.meridian.org) [hereinafter COMMITTEE REPORT].
6. See id. at 7.
7. Id.
8. Arafat and Barak Reach Agreement to End Violence (Oct. 4, 2000) at
http://www.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/meast/10/04/mideast.violence.04/ [hereinafter Arafat
and Barak].
9. The White House Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by President Clinton
and President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt in Delivery of Joint Statements at the Conclusion
of the Middle East Peace Summit (Oct. 17, 2000) (on file with Office of the Press
Secretary) [hereinafter White House Press Release].
10. See COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 2.
11. See id.
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This article seeks to examine the role of fact-finding as a tool
of dispute resolution in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian peace
process, and within the confines of the Mitchell Committee's
works and findings. Some of the questions this article seeks to
answer include: (1) what are the goals of fact-finding; (2) in what
types of circumstances has it served as a successful method of
confidence building; (3) how do the actions of the Mitchell
Committee fit into the historic model of fact-finding; (4) what were
the interests of the parties in forming the Mitchell Committee and
what goals were set for its outcome; and (5) were the
circumstances upon publication of the Mitchell Report conducive
to acceptance of its findings? Finally, this article will question the
contribution of the Mitchell Report and fact-finding to the peace
process and conflict resolution in the Middle East. This article will
conclude that fact-finding, however honorable the intention or
positive the effort, cannot serve as a method to impact such
weighty issues as the peace process in the Middle East.
II. FACT-FINDING IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
Fact-finding and inquiry are not new tools in international
relations, 12 or even in the Israeli-Arab conflict. 13 Generally, the
terms "fact-finding" and "inquiry" have been more or less
interchangeable.14 The goal in most cases is to examine the facts of
an incident to reduce tensions and areas of disagreement in a
problematic situation.15 A neutral and mutually trusted third
party, which is selected by the parties, plays an important role.16 A
determination of fact by a third party allows the sides to accept
compromises or findings that might not be politically feasible
without outside intervention. 17
The original concept, described in the 1899 Hague Convention
for the Pacific Settlement of Disputes, provided for the use of
12. See J. G. MERRILLS, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 44-61 (Cambridge
Univ. Press 3d ed. 1998).
13. See Special Committee on Palestine, G.A. Res. 106 (S-1), U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess.,
79th mtg. U.N. Doc. AJ310 at 192 (1947). The U.N. created a fact-finding committee in
1947 "[T]o ascertain and record facts, and to investigate all questions and issues relevant
to the problem of Palestine." Id.
14. PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST'S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW 277 (Routledge 7th ed. 1997) (1970).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See id.
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inquiry commissions for disputes involving neither honor nor
essential interests.18 This limitation was intended to ease the
concerns of smaller states that such commissions might serve as a
vehicle for foreign intervention.19 Especially in response to the
conflict between Spain and the United States following the
mysterious sinking of the USS Maine in January 1898, the
international community wanted to prevent disagreements from
escalating into armed conflict.20 The 1907 Hague Convention
expanded on its predecessor, offering an extremely detailed series
of procedures for inquiry commissions.21 Such a mechanism can be
initiated by a multilateral or bilateral treaty,22 through a decision
by an international organization, 23 or by a mutual agreement
between the parties.
24
18. Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, Hague Title III,
art. 9, http://yale.edu/lawwed/avalon/landofwar/hague01.htm (July 29, 1899) [hereinafter
Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes].
19. MERRILLS, supra note 12, at 45.
20. See id.
21. See id. at 47. The Hague Convention of 1907 dedicated twenty-eight of ninety-
seven articles to the concept of commissions of inquiry. NISSIM BAR-YAACOv, THE
HANDLING OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES BY MEANS OF INQUIRY 2 (Oxford Univ. Press
1974). The Hague Convention proclaims that states involved in disputes, which arise from
a difference of opinion on factual points, would agree to establish a commission of inquiry
whose task is to facilitate a solution to the dispute by an impartial and conscientious
investigation. Id The report is confined to finding of facts and is not considered as having
a character of an arbitral award. Id The parties reserve complete freedom to accept the
findings. Id.
22. During the thirty years following the second Hague Convention, many states
signed bilateral treaties calling for the settlement of disputes by commissions of inquiry or
arbitration. See MERRILLS, supra note 12, at 51-52. Although an extensive series of
treaties were signed, a pattern of inquiries was not established. Id. at 52. In the 1990s,
however, a fact-finding committee was set up based upon a 1914 treaty between the
United States and Chile in the case of Letelier and Moffit, which arose from the alleged
assassination of two Americans by Chilean intelligence officers in Washington D.C. in
1976. See id. at 55-57. The sides reached a compromise based on the Committee findings in
1992. Id. at 56-57.
23. See BAR-YAACOV, supra note 21, at 2-3. This is an area that most frequently uses
fact-finding. See id. at 5. The U.N. Security Council has inquiry authority per Article 34 of
the Charter of the United Nations. Id. at 3. Over the years, the United Nations, the
International Red Cross and the International Court of Justice established a variety of
methods of inquiry with a range of rules for procedures and mandates, often based upon
the needs of specific circumstances. See id. at 8-9. The United Nations initiated a number
of studies and resolutions on the matter of fact-finding. See e.g., Declaration on Fact-
finding by the United Nations in the Field of the Maintenance of International Peace and
Security, G.A. Res. 46/59, U.N. GAOR, 67th Sess., U.N. Doc. AJRes/46/59 (1991); United
Nations Secretary General, Methods of Fact-Finding: Report of the Secretary General, U.N.
GAOR, 20th Sess., Annexes, Agenda Items 90 & 94, U.N. Doc. A/5694/Annexes (1965);
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In cases where the parties themselves agreed to such
involvement, the mandate and terms of reference of the body are
sometimes determined by an ad hoc agreement between the
parties.25 In most cases, the mandate determines the facts in
dispute that lead to a negotiated settlement between the parties.
26
Although there are no express obligations to accept the findings,
they usually are accepted.
27
Despite the vision of the Hague Conventions and the
subsequent series of treaties and international activity, this tool is
infrequently used.28  Only four inquiries used the Hague
Convention model in the past eighty-one years. 29 The main reason
for such limited use is that states are reluctant to allow
interference with their sovereignty. 30  The states are
understandably hesitant to be held accountable for their acts in an
international forum.31 Fact-finding will only be employed when
the key issues involve fact, rather than policy or law, and most
importantly, when all of the parties are "willing to accept that their
version of events may be proven wrong."
32
In most circumstances, parties seek non-binding suggestions
to dispute resolutions. 33 Conciliation, a related method of dispute
resolution, is sometimes also employed. 34 The Institute of
International Law defines conciliation as:
A method for the settlement of international disputes of any
nature according to which a Commission set up by the Parties,
either on a permanent basis or an ad hoc basis to deal with a
dispute, proceeds to the impartial examinaion of the dispute
and attempts to define the terms of a settlerhent susceptible of
and U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Annexes, Agenda Item 87, U.N. Doc. A/6228/Annexes
(1966).
24. The two most famous cases that used the Hague model of fact-finding were The
Dogger Bank Case (Gr. Brit. v. Russ.), Hague Ct. Rep. (Scott) 403 (Comm'n of Inquiry
1905) and the Red Crusader Inquiry (1961). Both of these cases, like many others, availed
fact-finding and involved events at sea.
25. See MALANCZUK, supra note 14, at 277.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See MERRILLS, supra note 12, at 47.
29. Id. at 47-50.
30. See id. at 60.
31. See id. at 61.
32 Id. This was not the case in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the work of the
Mitchell Committee.
33. Id. at 45.
34. Id. at 62-63.
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being accepted by them or of affording the Parties, with a view
to its settlement, such aid as they may have requested. 35
While conciliation commissions function to investigate
disputes and suggest possible settlement terms, they emphasize
legal issues and are more political than fact-finding commissions,
depending on the circumstances and the sides involved.36 The goal
is not to illuminate the conflict, but to identify methods for
conciliation.37 As Merrills emphasizes, "its investigative powers
are.., a means to an end."' 38 Thus, a line of investigation will not
be pursued if its exposure will make conciliation more difficult.39
As in fact-finding, the report from a conciliation commission is not
necessarily binding on the parties. 4° Usually, the commission
submits a draft to the parties for comments. 41 If accepted, an
agreement is drafted with the proposed terms.42 If rejected, the
process is concluded with no further obligation.
43
Despite a wave of conciliation commission treaties signed just
before World War I1,44 conciliation as a method of dispute
resolution remains under-utilized for many of the same reasons as
fact-finding.45 Nevertheless, the United Nations continues to
exhibit significant interest in the potential uses of conciliation.
46
A debate exists as to the appropriateness of extending the
mandate of a fact-finding investigation to include offering
recommendations for a dispute settlement.47 In such instances, it
may be possible to join fact-finding and conciliation
35. Regulation on the Procedure of International Conciliation, Art. 1., at 385-91,
Ann. IDI 49-11 (1961). During the pre-World War II period there was a larger role for
bilateral conciliation. See MERRILLS, supra note 12, at 64-70. As with fact-finding, states
are reluctant to voluntarily submit jurisdiction to a third party. See id. at 45. In multilateral
treaties, however, such procedures are almost routine. See id. at 64-70.
36. MERRILLS, supra note 12, at 70-72.
37. Id. at 71.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 62.
41. See id. at 72.
42. See id.
43. See id. at 71.
44. See id. at 51-52.
45. See id. at 69-71.
46. See e.g., United Nations Model Rules for the Conciliation of Disputes Between
States, G.A. Res. A/50/50, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 313, U.N. Doc.
A/50/49 (1995).
47. See BAR-YAACOV, supra note 21, at 1.
[Vol. 24:289
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responsibilities. 48 Here, while the sides remain free to reject
suggestions, there is a focus on resolution suggestions from both
parties and in the final report.49 While this alternative falls short of
mediation or other legal methods of dispute resolution, it offers a
judicial-like environment that compels both parties to submit to
the "judgment" of a third party.
One interesting United Nations sponsored model of fact-
finding or conciliation commission in the Middle East was the
formation of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine
(UNSCOP).50 UNSCOP visited Palestine and held hearings in
Jerusalem during June and July of 1947 to recommend suggestions
for the future of the region.51 Of course, this was neither fact-
finding for a specific event nor a commission created by the parties
to the conflict.52 The General Assembly gave UNSCOP "the
widest powers to ascertain and record facts, and to investigate all
questions and issues relevant to the problem of Palestine."
53
The United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181 of
November 29, 1947 adopted UNSCOP's recommendations. 54 The
Jewish community of Palestine accepted the plan. The Palestinian
leadership and the Arab members of the United Nations, however,
rejected UNSCOP's plan to partition Palestine and Resolution
181. 55 Consequently, the proposals were not implemented.
48. See id. at 19. After much debate, the U.N. decided in 1967 to reject the
combination of fact-finding and conciliation and not to adopt a proposal to create a
permanent commission of inquiry available to states, organs of the U.N. and specialized
agencies. MALANCZUK, supra note 14 at 278. The U.N., however, coordinates a listing of
competent fact-finding experts to be available to parties choosing to use such a procedure.
Id.
49. See MERRILLS, supra note 12, at 71-72.
50. Special Comm. on Palestine, supra note 13, at 192.
51. Id.
52. See id. at 192-93.
53. lId at 192.
54. G.A. Res. 181, U.N. GAOR, 2nd Sess., U.N. Doc. A/519, at 132 (1947).
55. TRYGVE LIE, IN THE CAUSE OF PEACE: SEVEN YEARS WITH THE UNITED
NATIONS 194 (MacMillan Co. 1954). The resolution was approved by a vote of thirty-three
against thirteen, with ten abstentions. Id. Thirty-nine years later, in November 1988, the
Palestine Liberation Organization declared its acceptance of Resolution 181. PALESTINE
LIBERATION ORGANIZATION, A CRISIS OF FAITH: SECOND SUBMISSION OF THE
PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION TO THE SHARM EL-SHEIKH FACT-FINDING
COMMITTEE 12 (2000), available at http://www.nad-plo/eye/Acrisis%20offaith.pdf
(last visited, Feb. 16, 2002) [hereinafter SECOND SUBMISSION OF PALESTINE LIBERATION
ORGANIZATION]. Even within the framework of the Mitchell Committee, the
Palestinians presented this belated acceptance as their "historic compromise" in the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Id.; MAKOVSKY, supra note 1, at 8-9.
2002]
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These types of dispute resolution were also considered in the
Egypt-Israel conflict over the borders in the Taba and other
areas.56 Article IV of the Treaty of Peace (1979) between Egypt
and Israel called for the Joint Commission to demarcate the
international border between the two parties. 57 As part of the
work of the Joint Commission, a disagreement arose as to the
precise locations of the boundary line in Taba and other areas.58
Article VII of the Treaty of Peace states:
1. Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of
this treaty shall be resolved by negotiations.
2. Any such disputes which cannot be settled by negotiations
shall be resolved by conciliation or submitted to arbitration.
59
Negotiations (with U.S. mediation) did not result in an
agreement.60 The parties agreed to submit their differences
regarding the location of fourteen boundary pillars, including the
Ras Taba area, in a joint process of conciliation and arbitration. 61
As part of the arbitration agreement, there was an extensive
attempt to reach a settlement via conciliation when arbitration was
still in progress.62 No agreement was reached and the arbitration
tribunal resolved the dispute in favor of Egypt.
63
Thus, neither attempt at dispute resolution was successful.
The Arab countries rejected the UNSCOP findings.64 The sides
could not and/or would not reach a compromise in the Egypt-
56. Egypt-Israel Agreement to Arbitrate the Boundary Dispute Concerning the Taba
Beachfront, 26 I.L.M. 1421 (1986) [hereinafter Egypt-Israel Agreement].
57. Egypt-Israel: Treaty of Peace, Mar. 26, 1979, 18 I.L.M. 362, 363-64. Annex Ito the
Treaty called for the Israeli withdrawal to the lines determined by the Joint Commission
to be completed by April 25, 1982. Id. at 363. When the lines could not be agreed upon,
the sides agreed to submit the remaining technical questions regarding the international
boundary to an agreed procedure that achieves a final and complete resolution, in
conformity with Article VII of the Treaty of Peace. Id. at 364.
58. Egypt-Israel Agreement, supra note 56, at 1430.
59. Egypt-Israel: Treaty of Peace, supra note 57, at 366.
60. Egypt-Israel Agreement, supra note 56, at 1430.
61. Id.
6Z Id. Article IX of the Agreement to Arbitrate provides for the establishment of a
three-member "chamber" of the Arbitration Tribunal to "explore the possibilities of a
settlement of the dispute." Id. at 1432. Each side named its representative to the tribunal
to serve in the chamber along with an agreed third member, Pierre Bellet from France. Id.
The chamber, unable to reach an agreement or make a recommendation to the tribunal,
required a determination by the Arbitration Tribunal. Id. at 1433.
63. Boundary Dispute Concerning the Taba Area, Arbitration Award, Egypt-Israel,
27 I.L.M. 1421, 1493-94 (1988) [hereinafter Arbitration Award].
64. See LIE, supra note 55, at 194.
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Israel border issue. 65 In both cases, the concerns seemed to be too
material to allow compromises proposed by a third party. The
concept of bridging the gaps and compromising via these
mechanisms failed. In the Egypt-Israel border issue, however, the
sides allowed a final legal determination by the arbitration
tribunal. 66 Perhaps the sides saw this as an action to promote the
recently signed peace agreement, as well as a path to an ultimate
resolution of the dilemma. The binding nature of the
determination of the arbitration panel, however, differed from the
process of fact-finding or conciliation that demanded a
consideration of compromise. 67 Also, there might have been a
cultural consideration regarding compromise in the Middle East.
Difficulties in the region and political regimes in the majority of
the states created situations that were not conducive to
compromise. Two brave leaders who advocated compromise,
Anwar Sadat and Yitzhak Rabin, paid with their lives.
III. BACKGROUND TO THE CONFLICT
Israel and the Palestinians had a history of negotiating and
reaching agreements even before the memorable handshake
between Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat on the U.S. White
House lawn on September 13, 1993. That handshake signaled a
mutual recognition and a shared goal to gradually end enmity in
the region. 68 A series of agreements were signed, yet a number of
setbacks challenged the attempt to foster a relationship.69 Ehud
Barak was elected Prime Minister of Israel in May 1999 on the
platform that he would expedite the negotiation process between
the parties.70 In September 1999, the parties committed to a
fifteen-month timeline for implementing agreements and working
together to resolve remaining issues.71
65. See Arbitration Award, supra note 63, at 1430.
66. Egypt-Israel Agreement, supra note 56, at 10.
67. Miriam Shapiro, Dispute Resolution: General Methods and CSCE Mechanisms,
ASIL NEWSLETTER, Sept. 1994.
68. See generally, Declaration of Principles, supra note 3.
69. See COMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 5,8-18.
70. Result Fuels Optimism in Middle East, BBC NEWS (May 18, 1999), at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/ hi/english/world/middle east/newsid_346000/34672.stm.
71. See The Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum on Implementation Timeline of
Outstanding Commitments of Agreements Signed and the Resumption of Permanent
Status Negotiations, Sept. 4, 1999, 38 I.L.M. 1465, 3-8 [hereinafter Memorandum of
20021
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In Spring 2000, Barak reached the conclusion that a summit
meeting between the leaders was a necessary catalyst to reach a
historic agreement. 72 At the invitation of the United States, the
parties met at Camp David, near Washington D.C. with U.S.
representatives led by then-President William J. Clinton. 73 From
July 11-25, 2000, for the first time, the parties openly discussed the
most difficult "permanent status" issues of the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict. These issues included Jerusalem, the refugees, settlements
and recognition of an independent Palestinian state.74 Despite the
marathon meetings and twelve days of seclusion, the parties did
not reach an agreement. 75
Tensions subsequently increased between Israel and the
Palestinians.76 The United States blamed the Palestinians for the
failure to reach a successful resolution at Camp David.77 In
response to the conclusion of the summit, President Clinton said:
[T]he Palestinians changed their position; [they] moved
forward. The Israelis moved more from the position they had...
I was not condemning Arafat, I was praising Barak. But I would
be making a mistake not to praise Barak because I think he
took a big risk. And I think it sparked, already, in Israel a real
debate, which is moving Israeli public opinion toward the
conditions that will make peace. So I thought that was
important, and I think it deserves to be acknowledged. 78
Implementation Timeline]. The Timeline set a goal of reaching "a comprehensive
agreement on all Permanent Status issues." Id. at l(d).
72. See Jane Perlez, Impasse at Camp David- The Overview; Clinton Ends Deadlocked
Peace Talks, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2000, at Al.
73. Jane Perlez, Camp Clinton Opens for the Summer, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2000, § 4,
at 2.
74. Jane Perlez, supra note 72.
75. President William J. Clinton, Statement on the Middle East Peace Talks at Camp
David, (July 25, 2000)(transcript available at http://www.state.gov/www/regions/nea/
00725_clintonstmt.htmi) [hereinafter Statement by President Clinton].
76. Barak: Time Running Out For Peace, BBC NEWS, Sept. 5, 2000, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/middleeast/newsid_910000/910609.stm.
77. See Statement by President Clinton, supra note 75.
78. Id. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and U.S. National Security Advisor
Samuel Berger offered even stronger statements in the days following the end of the
summit. See generally Interview by Margaret Warner with Madeleine Albright, Secretary
of State of the United States, NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, PBS (July 25, 2000) (transcript
available at httpl/www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle -east/july-dec2000/albright_7-25.htm); see
also Interview by Charlie Rose with Samuel Berger, United States National Security
Advisor, Timing was right for Camp David talks; gaps were narrowed (July 27, 2000)
(transcript available at http://www.usembassy.itY file2000_08/alia/a0080110.htm). For an
Fact-Finding as a Peace Negotiation Tool
Prime Minister Barak announced that the proposals made at
Camp David were void, and stated the Palestinians were
responsible for their rejection of the Israeli offers.79 In Israel,
Barak was criticized for making such far-reaching offers without
success.80 Arafat embarked on a month-long international tour to
discuss with world leaders the possibility of a unilateral Palestinian
declaration of independence. 81 At the end of his tour, Arafat
realized the international community would not support a
unilateral action by the Palestinians on the diplomatic front.82
Simultaneously, rhetoric regarding the threat of violence in the
region increased as a result of the deadlock in the peace process. 83
Nevertheless, secret negotiations continued in the region and in
Europe.8
4
On September 27, 2000, violence erupted in the region when a
roadside bomb exploded, wounding two Israeli soldiers at the
Netzarim Junction in the Gaza Strip.85 The next day, opposition
leader Ariel Sharon visited the Temple Mount in Jerusalem.
86
alternative view on the causes of the failure of Camp David see R. Malley, Fictions About
the Failure At Camp David, N.Y.TIMES, Jul. 8,2001, § 4, at 11.
79. Prime Minister Ehud Barak, Statement by Prime Minister Barak at Press
Conference Upon the Conclusion of Camp David Summit (July 26, 2000) (transcript
available at http://www.mfa.gov.il).
80. See Deborah Sontag, And Yet So Far: A special report: Quest for Mideast Peace:
How and Why It Failed, N.Y. TIMES, July 26,2001,,at Al.
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. See generally Interview by Gwen Ifill with George J. Mitchell, Committee
Chairman, Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee, NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, PBS
(May 7, 2001) (transcript available at httpl/www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle-east/jan-
juneOl/mitchell 5-7.htm) [hereinafter Ifill Interview with Mitchell].
84. Sontag, supra note 80. This article offers a comprehensive description of the
events from Camp David until the end of the Clinton administration including details
regarding the attempts to continue negotiations following the failure at Camp David. Id
85. GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL, FIRST STATEMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL
72 (2000), available at http://www.mfa.gov.il [hereinafter FIRST STATEMENT OF ISRAEL].
86. Id. at 75. The Temple Mount, to Jews, or Haram el-Sharif (Noble Sanctuary) to
Muslims, is a site holy to Jews and Muslims alike. For Jews, it was the site of the two
ancient Temples, and for Muslims it was the site of the ascension to heaven of the prophet
Muhammad. Today, both the Dome of the Rock and the Al Aqsa Mosque are situated on
the Mount and the Western Wall, a remnant of the Second Temple, a holy site for Jews, is
beneath it. Both the Israeli and Palestinian submissions to the Mitchell Committee deal
significantly with Sharon's visit to the Temple Mount. See id., at 75-80; see also SECOND
SUBMISSION OF PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION, supra note 55, at 7-10.
Interestingly, both take the position that the visit was not the root cause of the violence in
the region. See FIRST STATEMENT OF ISRAEL, supra note 85, at 54-55; see also SECOND
SUBMISSION OF PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION, supra note 55, at 10. In fact,
there are no factual disputes of the Sharon visit itself. Twenty-eight Israeli policemen
2002]
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Generally, in Israel, this action was considered to be a domestic
challenge to Prime Minister Barak. On September 29, protests in
the Temple Mount area occurred during and after Friday Muslim
prayers. That afternoon, four Palestinians were killed and fourteen
Israeli policemen were wounded. Violence reached the West Bank
and Gaza.
87
Diplomatic efforts began in an attempt to quell the violence.
On October 4, Prime Minister Barak and Chairman Arafat met in
Paris with French President, Jacques Chirac, and U.S. Secretary of
State, Madeline Albright.88 The parties agreed upon some "Points
of Understanding," which included a commitment by both sides
"to reduce and eliminate friction and confrontation."
89
Additionally, the parties preliminarily ^agreed that the United
States would develop with the Israelis and the Palestinians, as well
as in consultation with the United Nations Secretary General, a
committee of fact-finding on the events of the past several days. 90
Notwithstanding the promising nature of the agreement,
Arafat refused to sign at the last moment. 91
IV. FORMATION OF THE MITCHELL COMMITITEE
On October 16 and 17, the Israeli and Palestinian leaders met
again at a summit in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt. Other summit
participants included President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, U.S.
President Clinton, King Abdullah from Jordan, U.N. Secretary
General Kofi Annan and Javier Solana, European Union High
Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy.92 The
summit concluded with the parties agreeing to the establishment of
were injured that day while Palestinians reported no injuries or deaths on the day of the
visit. FIRST STATEMENT OF ISRAEL, supra note 85, at 79. Sharon did not enter any
religious shrine or deviate from the standard tourist path on the Temple Mount. See id. at
78-79. Of course, in the ensuing weeks, much propaganda was made of the visit-not
incidentally, the Palestinians have referred to the continuing wave of violence as the Al
Aqsa Intifada, invoking the Mosque as the source of the uprising. See SECOND
SUBMISSION OF PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION, supra note 55, at 10.
87. FIRST STATEMENT OF ISRAEL, supra note 85, at 81-82.
88. Id. at 93.
89. See id. (quoting Paris Summit, draft Points of Understanding, 4 October 2000
(Annex I, Tab 27)).
90. See Arafat and Barak, supra note 8.
91. FIRST STATEMENT OF ISRAEL, supra note 85, at 93. See also Palestinian Cease
Fire Compliance: Dilemmas for American Policy (Oct. 14, 2001), available at http://
www.jcpa.org /art/briefl-5.htm.
92. White House Press Release, supra note 9.
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a fact-finding committee.93 The parties additionally agreed to issue
public statements calling to end violence, renew security
cooperation and work towards further negotiations.94
Regarding the fact-finding committee, President Clinton said:
[T]he United States will develop with the Israelis and
Palestinians, as well as in consultation with the United Nations
Secretary-General, a committee of fact finding on the events of
the past several weeks and how to prevent their recurrence. The
committee's report will be shared by the U.S. President with the
U.N. Secretary-General and the parties prior to publication. A
final report shall be submitted under the auspices of the U.S.
President for publication. 95
The parties later agreed the committee would be chaired by
former U.S. Senator George J. Mitchell, and would include four
additional members: former Turkish President Suleyman Demirel,
Norwegian Foreign Minister Thorbjorn Jagland, former U.S.
Senator Warren Rudman and Mr. Solana. 96
The Israelis and Palestinians manifested a willingness to play
a role in determining the mandate for the Mitchell Committee.
97
The Committee, however, feared that such a focus would be
counterproductive and impractical in light of the already tense
atmosphere. 98 Further, the terms sought by the parties might
encumber the Committee's flexibility and independence. The
Committee instead focused its mandate on two letters sent by
President Clinton to Senator Mitchell, which outlined goals and
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Mitchell Gets Middle East Role, BBC NEWS, Nov. 8, 2000, available at
http://www.bbc.co.uklhi/englishluk/northern-ireland/newsid l 120001012306.stm.
97. See FIRST STATEMENT OF ISRAEL, supra note 85, at 9. On December 8, 2000, the
Palestinians presented a preliminary submission to the Committee, which included a series
of procedural suggestions. PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION, PRELIMINARY
SUBMISSION OF THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION TO THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMISSION OF INQUIRY 3-7, (2000), available at http://www.nad-plo/eye/inception%
20report.final.pdf [hereinafter PRELIMINARY SUBMISSION OF PALESTINE LIBERATION
ORGANIZATION]. The Israelis attempted to negotiate terms of reference regarding its
activities with the committee. FIRST STATEMENT OF ISRAEL, supra note 85, at 10. This
statement included details of Israel's views as to the appropriate role and procedures of
the Committee. Id. at 10-11.
98. See FIRST STATEMENT OF ISRAEL, supra note 85, at 9-10.
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working procedures for the Committee.99 In the second letter,
dated December 6, 2000, President Clinton wrote:
First, the Committee should ensure that it is, and is perceived to
be, fair and impartial. Specifically, the Committee should
operate in a transparent manner, allowing the parties to view
material offered by the other party and to comment on one
another's presentations. Also, as was agreed at Sharm, both
sides should have an opportunity to review the report and give
comments to the Committee before it becomes final.
Second, the Committee should seek to avoid any action that
could further inflame the already very tense situation.... (T)he
Committee should conduct its work in confidence rather than
through hearings.... Finally, if the Committee chooses to
retain professionals for assistance, they should conduct their
work quietly outside the glare of publicity and should share the
results only with the Committee. If these experts conduct
individual interviews or gather materials in the region relevant
to the Committee's mission, they should do so privately and
inform the Committee of their work, which the Committee
would bring to the attention of the parties for further comment.
Third, the Committee should strive to steer clear of any step
that will intensify mutual blame and finger-pointing between
the two parties. As I noted in my previous letter, 'the
Committee should not become a divisive force or a focal point
for blame and recrimination but rather should serve to forestall
violence and confrontation and provide lessons for the future.'
This should not be a tribunal whose purpose is to determine the
guilt or innocence of individuals or of the parties; rather, it
should be a fact-finding committee whose purpose is to
determine what happened and how to avoid it recurring in the
future. ... ,100
99. See COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 42-45. The letters, dated November 15,
2000 and December 6, 2000 respectively, were included in the Report of the Sharm el-
Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee. Id.
100. Letter from William J. Clinton, President of the United States, to George
Mitchell, Chairman, Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee (Dec. 6, 2000) (reprinted in
COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 44-45) [hereinafter Letter from President Clinton].
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V. FACT-FINDING ACTIVITIES
In late November 2000, the parties assigned points of contact
to work with the Mitchell Committee.10 1 Representatives of each
side were invited to meet with the Committee members in New
York for initial consultations. At that meeting, the participants
were asked to submit a written presentation to the Committee by
the end of December. Additionally, the parties were informed that
Committee members would visit the region for introductory
meetings on December 11 and 12.102 Further, the Committee
would consider additional visits as deemed necessary. Both parties
were expected to respond to the initial written presentations at a
later date.
Despite the agreement reached at Sharm el-Sheikh, none of
the terms written by President Clinton on October 17, 2000 were
effective except for the development of the Mitchell Committee.
At the conclusion of the summit, Prime Minister Barak publicly
called for implementation of the terms of the agreement, including
cessation of violence. 10 3 Chairman Arafat, however, did not make
a similar declaration, although a statement was made on
Palestinian television noting that "the Palestinian leadership"
instructed the Palestinian forces to follow up on the activities
agreed to at Sharm el-Sheikh. 10 4 Unfortunately, no security
cooperation was initiated and the violence continued. 10 5
An additional diplomatic attempt to end the violence took
place in Gaza at a meeting between Chairman Arafat and then
101. The Palestinians named Yasser Abed Rabbo as Palestinian Authority Minister for
Culture and Information. See Letter from Yasser Abed Rabbo, Minister of Culture and
Information, Palestine Liberation Organization, to Sen. George Mitchell and Members of
the Sharm el-Sheikh Fact Finding Committee (May 15,2001) (reprinted in COMMITEE
REPORT, supra note 5, at 58), available at http://www.nad-plo.org/eye/newsl8.html
[hereinafter Letter from Yasser Abed-Rabbo]. Israel named as its contact, Moshe
Kochanovsky, Deputy Director General for Special Projects at the Ministry of Defense.
See FIRST STATEMENT OF ISRAEL, supra note 85, at 142.
102- See, e.g., Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PM Barak and Interministerial Team
Meets With Former US Senator Mitchell's Fact-Finding Committee (Dec. 11, 2000),
available at http://www.mfa.gov.il (last visited Jan. 20, 2002). The visit included meetings
with Israel and the Palestinians, as well as short visits to Egypt and Jordan, as those
countries participated in the summit at Sharm el-Sheikh.
103. Barak Says End of Violence Will Be True Test of Summit Agrement, CNN, Oct.
17, 2000, available at http'J/asia.cnn.comI20 OfWORLD/meast/10/17/mideast.barak/ index.html.
104. See FIRST STATEMENT OF ISRAEL, supra note 85, at 96.
105. Id.
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Israeli Minister for Regional Cooperation, Shimon Peres. 10 6 The
parties agreed to issue a "Joint Statement on the Cessation of
Violence" on November 2, 2000.107 Before the statement was
issued, however, a car bomb exploded in a Jerusalem market,
killing two Israelis.
10 8
A. Written Submissions
Each party submitted two rounds of documents to the
Committee. These documents offered subjective narratives of the
prior events and the deteriorating relationship between the parties.
The documents were similar to legal brief arguments on
substantive and procedural issues. The parties presented their
views by way of videos, maps and aerial photos.10 9 Both sides also
submitted views on how they saw the completion of work by the
Committee including its recommendations as well as quickly
publicizing their submissions through media sources including the
Internet. They attempted to use the submissions to gain
advantages in the diplomatic circles and the public opinion. Many
meetings took place with both the Committee members and the
technical staff including officials, victims of violence, NGO's and
academia.' 10 The benefits of this process included providing a
forum for venting their concerns and frustrations, as well as
introducing the Committee and its staff to the nuances of the
conflict. The presentations additionally enabled the Committee to
direct its efforts towards pragmatic recommendations.
111
106. Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, Palestinian Cease-Fire Compliance:
Dilemmas for American Policy, Vol. 1, No. 5 (2001).
107. Id.
108. Bomb Kills Two in Jerusalem, BBC News, Nov. 2, 2000, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/ hi/english/world/middle-east/newsid_1004000/100499.stm.
109. PALESTINIAN LIBERATION ORGANIZATION, THIRD SUBMISSION OF PALESTINE
LIBERATION ORGANIZATION TO THE SHARM EL-SHEIKH FACT-FINDING COMMITTEE
11-12 (2001), available at http://www.nad.plo.org/mitchel%20report%2020documents.htm
[hereinafter THIRD SUBMISSION OF PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION]; FIRST
STATEMENT OF ISRAEL, supra note 85, at Annexes.
110. See COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 24-25. See also SECOND SUBMISSION
OF PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION, supra note 55.
111. Secretary of State Colin Powell, Remarks at a briefing in Washington D.C. on the
Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee regarding the release of the Mitchell Report on
Mideast Violence (May 21, 2001) (transcript available at http://www.jordan
embassyus.org/05212001003.htm) [hereinafter Remarks by Colin Powell].
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B. Palestinian Initial Submissions
In December 2000, the Palestinians presented two
submissions to the Mitchell Committee. 112 On December 11, 2000,
the Palestinians presented their Preliminary Submission of the
Palestine Liberation Organization to the International Commission
of Inquiry to the Committee members during their visit to the
region. 113 This submission primarily addressed procedural issues,
but it also presented Palestinian claims regarding the conflict.
114
Then on December 30, the Palestinians presented A Crisis of
Faith: Second Submission of the Palestine Liberation Organization,
which was their primary written presentation of facts. 115 Together,
these two presentations emphasized the central positions of the
Palestinians in the Israel-Palestinian conflict far beyond the issues
of violence during the previous three months, including the major
historical issues between the sides.
116
The Palestinian submissions offered a historical overview of
the region. 117 The papers detailed issues ranging from the U.N.'s
partition plan of 1947 to the "dashed expectations" of the
Palestinians as a result of the peace process. 118 Although not
expressly stated, the papers conveyed a message that the events
were not a reaction to one specific event, but instead a
combination of disappointments culminating over an extended
period. 119 As a result, the Palestinians saw no other option but to
resort to violence in order to end the regional stalemate.120 In
other words, the Palestinians saw themselves as merely reacting to
112. All three Palestinian submissions to the Mitchell Committee and their response to
the Mitchell Report may be found on the web site of the Negotiation Affairs Department
of the Palestine Liberation Organization: www.nad-plo.org.
113. PRELIMINARY SUBMISSION OF PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION, supra
note 97.
114. Id. at 11-12.
115. See SECOND SUBMISSION OF PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION, supra
note 55.
116. PRELIMINARY SUBMISSION OF PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION, supra
note 97, at 9-10; SECOND SUBMISSION OF PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION,
supra note 55, at 10-18.
117. PRELIMINARY SUBMISSION OF PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION, supra
note 97, at 9-10.
118. Id. See also SECOND SUBMISSION OF PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION,
supra note 55, at 13.
119. SECOND SUBMISSION OF PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION, supra note
55, at 13-15.
120. Id. at 10.
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the Israeli violence-actual physical violence as well as political and
economic threats. 121 The authors noted that more than seven years
after signing the Declaration of Principles,122 most Palestinians
had come to the conclusion that this faith was misplaced.123 The
Palestinians viewed Israel's attitude towards the implementation
of the signed agreement is perhaps best captured in late Prime
Minister Rabin's assertion that 'no dates are sacred. 1 24
The Palestinians' primary problems with the peace process
included the continual building of settlements, and Israel's non-
compliance with obligations taken as part of the various
agreements already signed by Israel and the Palestinians. As for
the settlement issue, the authors presented the Israelis' continued
policy of a "military-enforced dual system, and the persistent
infringement upon Palestinian civil, political and economic rights
by Israeli occupation forces" as the basis of the intifada of 1987-
1993.125
Further, the bulk of the Palestinian presentation blamed
Israel for the events of the three months following the eruption of
violence. 126 The central issues detailed by the presentation were
violence against civilians ("a one-sided war"), including a range of
statistics regarding the number of dead and wounded,
international principles regarding the illegal use of force by Israel
and a detail of different methods allegedly used "to kill and injure
Palestinians.' '127 The submission also described the Palestinians'
economic losses as a result of the violence. 128
The Palestinians emphasized the role of the international
community, as envisaged by the Palestinians. 129 They saw the
Mitchell Committee as an opportunity to internationalize the
conflict. Disappointed with the results of the direct negotiations
with the Israelis, the Palestinians presented the view that a greater
involvement from the international community would be
121. Id.
122. See Declaration of Principles, supra note 3.
123. SECOND SUBMISSION OF PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION, supra note
55, at 14.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 12.
126. Id. at 3, 10, 20, 27-28, 42, 46, 60.
127. Id. at 19,20-31.
128. Id. at 34-38.
129. Id. at 9.
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helpful.' 30 The Palestinians hoped that the Mitchell Committee,
like other international fora such as the U.N. General Assembly
and the Commission on Human Rights would be of use in
promoting their position in the conflict. 131 The Committee
mandate itself was presented as resulting not only from the
agreement reached between the parties at Sharm el-Sheikh, but
also from the Fourth Geneva Convention and U.N. Security
Council Resolution 1322 (2000).132 From the Palestinian
perspective, Israel's violation of international laws and norms in
recent violent attacks, in addition to the thirty-three years of
occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, was the central reason for
encouraging the involvement and shared responsibility of the
international community.
133
The Palestinians concluded their presentation with eight
recommendations to the Mitchell Committee. A majority of the
recommendations emphasized the "root causes" of their conflict
with the Israelis rather than the specific events. 134  The
recommendations included: (1) a demand for compliance with the
Fourth Geneva Convention, (2) an end to violence against the
Palestinian civilian population, (3) a lift on restrictions on freedom
of movement of persons, vehicles and goods, (4) a freeze on
settlement construction and expansion, (5) a gun control imposed
on Israeli settlers, (6) a call for Israeli compliance with the past
agreements, (7) a deployment of an international monitoring and
implementation mission and (8) an end to further attacks in the
Palestinian controlled areas.135
130. See PRELIMINARY SUBMISSION OF PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION,
supra note 97, at 6. The title of the preliminary Palestinian submission offered an alternate
name to the Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-finding Committee, "Mandate of the International
Commission of Inquiry," which invoked the spirit of internationalization. Id. at 4.
131. See id. at 5-6.
132. Id. at 4. On Oct. 7, 2000, the U.N. Security Council approved Resolution 1322,
which addressed the violence of the previous week. S.C. Res. 1322, U.N. SCOR, 4205'
mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1322 (2000). The resolution indicates the need for a "speedy and
objective inquiry" into these events. Id.
133. See PRELIMINARY SUBMISSION OF PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION,
supra note 97, at 9-10.
134. See id. at 5.
135. SECOND SUBMISSION OF PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION, supra note
55, at 53-59.
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C. Israel's Initial Submission
Israel submitted the First Statement of the Government of
Israel on December 29, 2000.136 The presentation emphasized that
the Palestinian leadership strategically encouraged violence after
being perceived by the international community as the cause of the
Camp David Summit failure. 137 The Israelis claimed that the
Palestinians blatantly violated their commitment to a peaceful
dispute resolution by choosing violent confrontation instead of
continued diplomatic dialogue. 138 The goal was to provide the
Palestinians with an opportunity to reestablish their historical
position as the underdogs in the conflict. 139 The presentation
detailed the history of agreements reached between the Israelis
and the Palestinians. 140  It stressed the repeated and
comprehensive obligations that were ignored by the Palestinian
Authority to work towards preventing incitement, violence and
continually fighting terror. 141 There is a detailed attempt to
respond to a claim raised against Israel relating to the
disproportionate use of force. 142
The summary of Israel's position regarding the violence was
stated as:
Israel did not seek the present confrontation. It was, and
continues to be, imposed upon Israel by the Palestinian side.
Within the severe constraints of the events of recent weeks,
Israel's actions have been directed towards containing the
confrontation, protecting persons not directly involved in the
conflict and their property, and avoiding casualties to its
military and police personnel in the performance of their
task. Israel has also been concerned to minimize serious injury
to those actively engaged on the Palestinian side.
While it has not always been possible, in the extreme
circumstances of the on-going violence, to meet all of these
objectives, Israel firmly maintains that it has acted in a
measured and responsible fashion in the circumstances." 143
136. FIRST STATEMENT OF ISRAEL, supra note 85, at 2.
137. Id. at 4.
138. Id. at 13.
139. See id. at 52-81.
140. See id. at 21-46.
141. See id.
142. See id. at 118-37.
143. Id. at 12.
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Israel detailed its concerns regarding the practice and policies
of the Palestinians including the exploitation of children by
sending them to participate in violent protests, promoting acts of
violence and terror directed at the Israeli civilians, specific acts of
barbarism, official and religious incitements, the release of
terrorist detainees from prisons, and the failure of the Palestinian
Authority to confiscate illegal weapons.144 In a significant number
of incidents, the Palestinian snipers hid in crowds of civilians and
opened fire.145 Additionally, the torture and lynching of two Israeli
reservist soldiers in Ramallah, and the destruction of the Jewish
holy site of Joseph's Tomb, were cited as examples of the nature of
the threat towards any Israeli national who fell into the hands of
the Palestinians.
146
The authors of the report compared the Palestinian riots to
"armed conflict short of war," thus mandating the application of
the rules of engagement of the Israeli military within the context of
these events.147 The nature and methods employed by the Israeli
military were described in detail to refute any claim of excessive
use of force. 148 The paper detailed the various types of non-lethal
weapons available to Israel, but claimed that since the violence
initiated by the Palestinians involved live-fire, non-lethal weapons
were often not a viable option.149
The submission included a long series of quotes taken from
articles by the international media citing public statements made
by the Palestinian leaders addressing these points.150 A series of
aerial photos, maps and even a collection of video clips were
included with the Israeli document.
151
The Israelis recommended that the Palestinians stop the
violence and return to the terms of the previous agreements
reached between the parties in an effort to ensure security for the
144. Id. at 14-16.
145. Id. at 12.
146. Id. at 15.
147. Id. at 133.
148. Id. at 132-33.
149. Id. at 127-28.
150. Id. at 70-75.
151. Id. at Appendix. The report entitled "A Crisis of Faith: Second Submission of the
Palestine Liberation Organization" also included a video and a large collection of
international reports and documentation. See SECOND SUBMISSION OF PALESTINE
LIBERATION ORGANIZATION, supra note 55, at 6.
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citizens of the region. 152 The Israelis further proposed concrete
measures, such as ending Palestinian incitement, returning
terrorists to prison and renewing security cooperation. 153 Israel
also proffered a number of confidence building measures it would
be disposed to undertake in an effort to "build the feeling of
security and progress on all sides." 15
4
D. Activities of Technical Staff
After the parties submitted their presentations to the
Committee at the end of December 2000, the Mitchell Committee
sent a delegation of approximately twelve aides, described as a
technical staff, to gather evidence and meet with the parties to
assist the five principal members of the Conunittee in their fact-
finding task. This diverse group included nationals from various
countries appointed by the Committee.
The Palestinians welcomed the technical staff and organized a
wide series of meetings and presentations. 155 They also submitted
two additional documents on specific issues of interest regarding
the conflict, in addition to a relatively large number of documents
prepared by a variety of Palestinian and international
organizations.1
56
The Israelis, on the other hand, already frustrated by the
shortcomings of the Sharm el-Sheikh Summit's failure to end
violence, were preparing for elections in early February 2001. They
deemed activities of the technical staff as extensions of the
ambiguous mandate promulgated by the Mitchell Committee, 157
and continued to be concerned by a lack of agreement on the
152. FIRST STATEMENT OF ISRAEL, supra note 85, at 17.
153. Id. at 140.
154. Id. at 141.
155. Palestine Liberation Organization Negotiations Affairs Dept., Minister Yaser
Abed Rabbo meets with the technical staff of the Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee,
Jan. 14,2001, available at http://www.nad-plo.org/press/nad/nadl6.html (last visited Mar. 1,
2002).
156. See Letter from Yasser Abed Rabbo to Senator George Mitchell and Members of
Sharm el-Sheikh Fact Finding Committee (Jan. 12, 2001), available at http://www.nad-
plo.org/eye/newsl8.html.
157. As noted above, President Clinton recognized in his letter of December 6, 2000 to
Senator Mitchell, that experts could assist the Committee in its efforts. Israel had already
raised these concerns before the Committee. See FIRST STATEMENT OF ISRAEL, supra
note 85, at 10-11; Letter from President Clinton, supra note 100. The role of the staff and
its authority, however, was not described. See iL
310 [Vol. 24:289
Fact-Finding as a Peace Negotiation Tool
terms of reference for the Mitchell Committee. 158 After the
technical staff visited the Temple Mount on January 13, 2001,
without coordinating the visit with the Israeli officials, Israel
decided to temporarily suspend its cooperation with the Mitchell
Committee.
159
Newly elected Prime Minister Ariel Sharon renewed ties with
the Committee. 160 He noted that while he believed "the setting up
of the Committee was a mistake of the previous government...
Israel would cooperate with the Committee and extend it any
necessary assistance to find out the truth [as] Israel does not fear
an examination of the facts."'161 One reason for this decision was
the active involvement of Shimon Peres, the Minister of Foreign
Affairs in Sharon's government. This surprising new partnership
was a key component in Sharon's formation of a unified national
government. Peres argued that for a new government to build
international credibility, it would be counterproductive to be
perceived as being responsible for the dissolution of the Mitchell
Committee. 16
2
Prime Minister Sharon welcomed a second visit of the
Committee members on March 21, 2001.163 During the four-day
visit to Israel and the Palestinian areas, the Committee members
held discussions with Sharon, Peres, Arafat and other political and
military leaders, as well as meeting with victims of violence from
158. See A. Ben, Israel Boycotts Mitchell Inquiry, HA'ARETZ (English Edition), Jan.
22,2001, at1.
159. See id. The technical staff and the Israelis began discussing modalities of such a
visit, but had not reached a conclusion when the technical staff visited the area in
coordination with the Palestinian Wakf, the religious authority that managed the area of
the Temple Mount. Id. The staff met with Wakf representatives during the visit. Id. Later,
members of the technical staff explained they had not coordinated the visit with the
Israelis after receiving advice that, due to the unique nature of the Temple Mount area,
diplomatic practice did not demand coordination for such a visit with Israel. Id. They also
explained that they hoped a low-key visit would allow the members of the Committee to
avoid such a visit adding to tensions. Id.
160. Janine Zacharia & Melissa Radler, Peres Fights International Force Plan at U.N.,
JERUSALEM POST, Mar. 16,2001, at 2A.
161. Embassy of Israel Press Releases, PM Sharon Meets with Mitchell Committee,
Mar. 21, 2001, available at http://www.israelemb.orglchicago/Israel%20update/
IsraelUpdate3-26-01,htm (last visited Mar. 4,2002).
162. See also Harvey Morris, Peres Meets Palestinians to Spur Talks, FINANCIAL TIMES
(London), Apr. 5, 2001, at 10.
163. Memorandum of Implementation Timeline, supra note 71; Embassy of Israel
Press Releases, PM Sharon Meets with Mitchell Committee, supra note 161.
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both sides. 164 Following this second visit, members of the technical
staff remained in the region for four more days for further
meetings with the Israeli officials to complete the fact-finding
efforts of the Committee. 165
E. Written Responses of the Sides
Both parties responded to the other party's submissions.
Israel and the Pale'tinians submitted their responses around the
time the Committee members made their second visit to the
region.166
1. Palestinian Response
In the Third Submission of the Palestinian Liberation
Organization to the Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-finding Committee, the
Palestinians responded to the Israeli claims regarding the root of
the violence, the Israeli characterization of the situation in the
region as an "armed conflict" and other specific points raised in
the Israeli submission. 1
67
Regarding the root causes of the violence, the Palestinians
reemphasized their dashed expectations from the peace process.
168
According to the Palestinians, the interim period had to be viewed
comprehensively, not only the short period since Camp David.
169
The Palestinians noted that despite the Israeli assertions to the
contrary in their presentation, the Palestinian efforts to promote
peace and security during the interim period were significant. 1
70
The authors noted that the Israeli "allegation is belied by the
Palestinian Authority's significant accomplishments in preventing
violence during the Interim Period and overlooks the legal
constraints imposed on its law enforcement efforts." 1
71
164. Embassy of Israel Press Releases, PM Sharon Meets with Mitchell Committee,
supra note 161.
165. Id.
166. GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL, SECOND STATEMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF
ISRAEL (Mar. 20, 2001), at http://www.mfa.gov.il [hereinafter SECOND STATEMENT OF
ISRAEL]. Israel submitted its second statement on Mar. 20, 2001. Id. The Palestinians
submitted their third submission on Apr. 3, 2001 (see THIRD SUBMISSION OF PALESTINE
LIBERATION ORGANIZATION, supra note 109).
167. THIRD SUBMISSION OF PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION, supra note
109, at 5, 51-54, 59-64.
168. Id. at 7-10.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 14-16.
171. Id. at 14.
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The document detailed Palestinian efforts to prevent
violence, including actions against illegal possession of weapons.172
The document also presented the efforts of the Palestinian
Authority to educate people in order to fight incitement. 173 At the
same time, it was argued that the acts of Israeli provocation, such
as settlement activities, broken deadlines and economic and
personal restrictions on Palestinians, were part of the frustration
and disappointment felt by the Palestinians throughout the peace
process. 174 Counterclaims about the Israeli statements and actions
in connection with incitement, such as claims of hate speech by
Israeli politicians and religious leaders, were presented to rebut
Israeli claims regarding the Palestinian incitement created by
textbooks.175 Finally, the Palestinians characterized the Israeli
proposals at Camp David as a dramatic departure from the
principles agreed to between the parties as modalities for making
peace, and thus falling short of the Palestinians' requirements
regarding a peace agreement. 176 According to the Palestinians,
Barak's offer did not meet the Palestinians' need regarding
Palestinian refugees, the final status of Jerusalem and other central
issues.177
As for the Israeli use of force, the Palestinians noted a
distinction in international law between an uprising and an armed
conflict.178 Furthermore, the Israelis' obligations and legal
standards, as an occupying force, within internationally recognized
frameworks, remain unchanged. 179 Thus, the Palestinians claimed
that if the occupation ended, so would the uprising. 180 The
Palestinians emphasized:
[t]he elements necessary for establishing an 'armed conflict' as a
matter of international law are not present; that demonstrations
are resistance to occupation; and that Israel, as an occupying
power has a duty to ensure that the Palestinian people are
172. THIRD SUBMISSION OF PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION, supra note
109, at 16-19.
173. See id. at 19-24.
174. PRELIMINARY SUBMISSION OF PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION, supra
note 97, at 9-10.
175. THIRD SUBMISSION OF PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION, supra note
109, at 20-22.
176. Id. at 46-47.
177. Id. at 46.
178. Id. at 52.
179. Id. at 54.
180. Id. at 53.
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protected. Rather, Israel's classification of the current uprising
as an 'armed conflict' is predicated simply on the presence of
firearms at some, and not all, demonstrations. And, it is a
means by which Israel attempts to derogate from its obligations
as set out in international law.
181
In concluding the legal aspects of the conflict, the authors of
the Palestinian presentation stated that the key to understanding
the events was not as claimed by the Israelis:
The link between settlements and the present intifada is clear:
many of the acts of violence carried out by Israeli soldiers and
settlers, that have resulted in Palestinian deaths and injuries,
have taken place on the heavily defended roads leading to the
settlements or in the proximity of the settlements. Israel is not
under threat-the Palestinians are. And they will continue to be
unless and until the international community puts an end to
Israel's goal of separating the Palestinian people from its land-
and controlling the former while annexing the latter.
182
2. Israeli Response
In its response, Israel reiterated its overall view of the
continuing conflict and addressed specific allegations raised by the
Palestinians. 183 The Israelis discussed what they considered to be a
series of factual and legal misrepresentations in the Palestinian
submissions, particularly regarding claims of the use of excessive
force and alleged assassinations by the Israel Defense Forces. 184
At the beginning of the statement, the Israeli authors
commented on the nature of the Palestinian presentations:
The Palestinian submissions are notable for what they leave
out. Nothing is said-not a single word-of Palestinian policies
and practices over the past five-and-a-half months. Nothing is
said about attacks on Israeli civilians, about the on-going
incitement to hatred and violence, about the release of terrorist
detainees, about the calculated exploitation of children, about
the use of illegal weapons, about the destruction of Jewish Holy
Sites... Above all, nothing is said about ending the violence. It
is quite extraordinary that in four Palestinian submissions to the
Committee there is not a single word about the ending of the
181. Id. at 51.
182. Id. at 58.
183. See SECOND STATEMENT OF ISRAEL, supra note 166.
184. Id. para. 24-42.
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bloodshed; about stopping the attacks. The omission is telling.
The message is clear. It has even been expressed by senior
Palestinian officials. Palestinian attacks against Israelis will not
end until Israel accepts Palestinian demands.185
As for Israel's use of force, the authors reemphasized their
position that Israel acted in a measured and proportional manner
in response to the Palestinian violence. 186 Additionally, they
noted that the Israeli civilians and armed forces have come under
violent attacks by persons who do not wear uniforms, often in
crowded civilian areas.187 The Israelis argued that these individuals
cannot claim to be civilians or receive the protection afforded to
civilians. 188 Thus, those who took part in the attacks cannot claim
immunity, 189 and therefore it is permissible, in accordance with
international law, to target those who directly take part in
hostilities.19
0
As to the issue of economic damages, Israel posited that
despite shared Israeli and Palestinian interests in economic
cooperation, the Palestinians have no inherent right to work in
Israel or to receive automatic economic benefits. 191 In the Israelis'
opinion, economic cooperation and commercial interaction must
be viewed as byproducts of peaceful interaction between
people.192  Israel enacted restrictive measures for security
reasons. 193 Similarly, allegations of environmental damage and
collective punishment were rejected. 194 In conclusion, Israel
emphasized its interest in ending violence and ensuring security for
its citizens. 1
95
VI. CONCLUSIONS OF THE COMMITTEE - THE MITCHELL REPORT
Prior to publication, during the first week of May 2001, the
Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee Report was presented to
U.S. President George W. Bush, to Israel and the Palestinians, and
185. l& at Section A, para. 3.
186. Id. at 21-23.
187. Id. at 18.
188. Id.
189. Id. para. 45, at 17.
190. Id. at 17.
191. Id. at 29.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. See id. at 31-34.
195. Id. at 10,35.
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to the Secretary General of the United Nations. 196 Upon
presentation, the sides were asked to offer comments to be
appended to the final published report. 197  While official
publication waited for the parties' comments, the media
immediately and widely documented the details of the report. 198
On May 21, 2001, the full report, including the comments, was
publicly released. 199
A. Details of Report
Despite the Mitchell Committee's mandate "to determine
what happened and how to avoid it recurring in the future," 200 the
Report predominantly emphasized the future.20 1 In fact, the
Report purposely did not answer many central fact-finding
questions within the mandate. 20 2 The Report's authors appeared
to believe that any detailed fact-finding into such a tense
atmosphere would not only challenge the Report's credibility and
its chance for acceptance, but might even exacerbate the problems
in the region.20
3
Instead, the Report included proposals to assist the parties in
stopping the violence, rebuilding confidence and returning to the
196. See Ifill Interview with Mitchell, supra note 83. The Committee saw this as a
politically viable interpretation of the terms set out by President Clinton in the concluding
statement at Sharm el-Sheikh and the letter to Senator Mitchell dated December 6, 2000.
See COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 9. President Clinton stated that "both sides
should have an opportunity to review. the report and give comments to the Committee
before it becomes final." Id. at 40. However, it seemed the Committee members were
concerned that allowing the parties to comment on a draft version would not facilitate a
quick release, or an independent document. Id. at 67-69. Thus, while the sides were
offered the opportunity to comment, and the comments were appended to the published
report, they had no chance to influence a final version of the document. Id. Interestingly,
U. S. Central Intelligence Agency Director George Tenet adopted a similar strategy in the
June 2001 cease-fire negotiations. A Plan to Curtail the Violence, HA'ARETZ (English
Edition), June 14, 2001.
197. Ifill Interview with Mitchell, supra note 83.
198. See, e.g., id.; Alan Sipress, Mitchell Philosophical About Report on Mideast
Tension, WASH. POST, May 13,2001, at A2.
199. Remarks by Colin Powell, May 21,2001, supra note 111.
200. Letter from President Clinton, supra note 100.
201. See generally COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5.
202. See id.
203. This has been understood as a "limitation" of fact-finding ever since the 1899
Hague Convention, which proposed use of the tool in cases "involving neither honor nor
essential interests." Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, supra
note 18. Such limitations may have been a strong argument for the inappropriateness for
"fact-finding" as a method of conflict resolution between the Israelis and Palestinians.
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negotiating process. 20 4 The Committee noted that its mandate was
not a solution to the conflict or a determination of the scope of the
negotiations, but rather a strategy to address the previous eight
months of crisis.20 5 The Report set forth a modest goal. It
recommended a path for stopping the violence and returning the
parties to the negotiating table.20 6 In that context, the Report was
a valuable success.
The Report offered some analysis of the events, primarily by
presenting each party's positions, in many cases without comment
or resolution.20 7 In presenting the facts and making the
recommendations, the Report scrupulously attempted to avoid
placing blame on either party. 20 8 This political balancing act
sometimes went too far, blurring one side's unique responsibility
within a specific issue. For example, the uniquely Palestinian
responsibility to prevent the use of illegal weapons was presented
in the Report's Recommendations by stating, "the parties should
abide by the provisions of the Wye River Agreement prohibiting
illegal weapons." 20 9 Similarly, incitement was noted with equal
measure. 2
10
The bulk of the Report, however, discussed the proposal's
prospective impact.211 The Report's conciliatory tone offered a
path towards a return to the peace process. 212  The
recommendations emphasized three distinct stages: (1) an end to
the violence; (2) the rebuilding of confidence; and (3) resuming
negotiations.213 The "principal recommendation" urged each side
to recommit themselves to the spirit of Sharm el-Sheikh and to
implement the decisions made there in 1999 and 2000.214 This
204. See generally COMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 4-5.
205. Id. at 8.
206. Id. at 4-5.
207. Id. at 10-13.
208. Id. at 10.
209. Id. at 36.
210. Id. at 34.
211. Id. at 33-38.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 4, 33. The reference was to the Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum on
Implementation Timeline of Outstanding Commitments of Agreements Signed and the
Resumption of Permanent Status Negotiations, supra note 71, which offered an agreed
framework for the resumption of permanent status negotiations and the Statement of
President Clinton at the conclusion of the Sharm El-Sheikh Summit, Oct. 17, 2000. White
House Press Release, supra note 9.
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quasi-philosophical observation expressed a need for the two sides
to return to bilateral cooperation.
In its opening words, the Report emphasized that the sides
"must act swiftly and decisively to halt the violence. '215 Also, the
sides must rebuild trust, which can be accomplished by
implementing a series of proposed confidence-building
measures. 216 The proposals covered a range of subjects such as
halting incitement, the issue of Israeli settlements, rejecting and
combating terror, a renewal of economic cooperation, protection
of holy sites, as well as responsibilities and procedures of security
forces by both parties.217 These actions were important to resume
"full and meaningful negotiations" based upon "mutual
agreements and understandings" reached between the parties. 218
This method was wise, as it offered small, incremental steps away
from violence, while moving towards building faith and achieving
the ultimate interest of all concerned-peace negotiations. It also
offered political benefits to both sides, which could assist in
domestic marketing for the adherence to the plan terms.219
While the recommendations addressed most of the major
issues regarding current violence, some key issues were apparently
intentionally omitted from the operative portion of the Report.
Key examples include: (1) the conclusion that an international
presence would not be appropriate without the agreement of the
two sides; (2) lack of determination regarding the Palestinian
allegation of "assassinations;" (3) the Israeli claim as to the
Palestinian Authority's role in the planning and coordination of
the start of violence; (4) the extent to which Ariel Sharon's visit
was responsible for the outbreak of violence;220 and (5) any
determination about the legality of positions or accountability of
either party in international law. 221 The decision to omit these
issues further underscored the Report's emphasis on conciliation
as opposed to traditional fact-finding. The Committee's goal to
present a politically acceptable report to both parties prevented
conclusions on any of these central fact-finding issues.
215. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 4.
216. Id. at 4-5.
217. See id. at 33-37.
218. Id. at 32.
219. See id. at 8-9.
220. See id. at 13. In fact, the Report expressly rejects the claims of both sides
regarding the outbreak of the violence without offering any alternative explanations. lId
221. See id. at 10.
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B. The Parties' Responses - Differing Interpretations
Both parties quickly announced a general acceptance of the
Mitchell Committee findings.222 In the introduction letter to the
parties' responses, the Committee noted: "We are grateful for the
generally positive tone of all of the comments, and we are struck
by the convergence of the parties' views on our report. ' 223 In fact,
in the weeks following its publication, the acceptance of the
Mitchell Report had become a central aspect of the parties'
diplomatic posture. Nevertheless, in their official responses, the
two parties offered widely differing interpretations of the Report
and some criticism to many of its findings. 224 Senator Mitchell
anticipated such a reaction when he commented, before the
submission of the responses, "[1look, it's human nature. They're
going to say they like the parts that agree with their positions and
they dislike the parts that don't agree with their positions. That's
what I fully expect will occur."225
1. Israeli Response
A key aspect of the Israelis' response to the Mitchell Report
was the understanding of the Report's recommendations as four
distinct stages.226 The Israelis regard the fulfillment of each stage
as a necessary precursor to proceed with the process.227 Thus, the
first stage of ending the violence needs to be achieved before
enacting the other steps and recommendations. A "cooling-off'
period would follow, which would allow for the enactment of
222. See generally Letter from Dan Naveh, Minister in the Prime Minister's Office, to
Senator George J. Mitchell, Chairman of the Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee
(May 15, 2001), reprinted in COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 50. See also Letter
from Yasser Abed Rabbo, supra note 101.
223. Letter from the members of the Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee to
Colin L. Powell, Secretary of State, United States Department of State (May 16, 2001)
reprinted in COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 46.
224. Compare GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL, COMMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF
ISRAEL ON THE REPORT OF THE SHARM EL-SHEIKH FACT-FINDING COMMITTEE (May
15, 2001) reprinted in COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 51-57 [hereinafter COMMENT
OF ISRAEL], available at http://www.mfa.gov.il, with PALESTINE LIBERATION
ORGANIZATION, OFFICIAL RESPONSE OF THE PALESTINE LIBERTATION
ORGANIZATION TO THE FINAL REPORT OF THE SHARM EL-SHEIKH FACT-FINDING
COMMITTEE (2001), reprinted in COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 59 [hereinafter
RESPONSE OF PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION].
225. Ifill Interview with Mitchell, supra note 83.
226. COMMENT OF ISRAEL, supra note 224, at 51-57.
227. See id.
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confidence building measures so that negotiations could finally
resume.228 In its written response, Israel noted its dispute with the
findings regarding the settlement issue,229 as well as the Report's
criticism of actions taken by Israeli Defense Forces.
230
2. Palestinian Response
Conversely, the Palestinians determined that the Mitchell
Report's findings and recommendations should be accepted and
implemented concurrently.231  Without Israel directing an
immobilization of settlement activity, as the Report recommended,
there would neither be an end to violence nor acceptance of any
other terms of the proposal.232 To deal with the implementation
issues, the Palestinians urged the involvement of the international
participants from the Sharm el-Sheikh Conference of October
2000.233 The Palestinians expressed disappointment with the non-
legal nature of the findings, as well as the Report's failure to
accept the Palestinian demand regarding an international presence
in the region.
234
C. Diplomatic Efforts
In May 2001, despite the release of the Mitchell Report,
violence continued in the region. 235 The killing continued during
the days following the release of the Report.
236
One hour after the release of the Report, Secretary of State
Colin Powell expressed the United States' support for the Report,
tendering an interpretation that could be seen as consistent with
both the Israeli and the Palestinian interests. 237 Powell, however,
noted that the Report should be interpreted within a framework of
228. Id. at 54, 56.
229. Id. at 55. Israel saw this issue as beyond the mandate of the Mitchell Committee
since it was agreed by the sides that settlements was one of the issues to be determined as
part of the permanent status negotiations. It cited the Declaration of Principles, supra
note 3.
230. See id. at 53-54. Israel questioned the factual analysis in COMMITTEE REPORT,
supra note 5, at 13.
231. See RESPONSE OF PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION, supra note 224, at
60.
232. See id. at 61-62.
233. Id. at 61.
234. Id. at 64-67.
235. See Remarks by Colin Powell, supra note 111.
236. See id.
237. See id.
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a timeline leading to direct negotiations. 238 He additionally
emphasized the importance of various confidence-building
measures, including the need to halt settlement activity. 239 Finally,
Powell announced plans for increased U.S. diplomatic involvement
in the region.
240
The international community overwhelmingly approved and
supported the findings of the Report.241 Many regarded the stature
of the Committee members coupled with the pragmatic nature of
the document as a positive instrument for the region.242 Active
participation from European Mitchell Committee members Javier
Solana and Thorbjorn Jagland were incentives for support from
other European nations. Any achieved success would strengthen
Europe's desire to be a "player" and not merely a "payer" in
Middle East diplomacy.243 The Bush Administration, wary of its
increased involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, viewed
the Report as a "lifeline" for both parties, and a way to bolster
America's regional presence. 244
Around the time of publication of the Mitchell Report, Israel
implemented a unilateral cease-fire, overcoming the first obstacle
proffered by the recommendations. 245 Nevertheless, Palestinian
violence ensued with the murder of twenty-one Israeli youths by a
terrorist suicide bomber outside a discotheque in Tel Aviv on June
1, 2001.246 In the face of these deaths, Yasser Arafat was under
extreme diplomatic pressure to move towards a fragile ceasefire
agreement. 247 On June 13, 2001, George Tenet, Director of the
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. See Letter from Kofi A. Annan, U.N. Secretary General, to George J. Mitchell,
Committee Chairman, Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee (May 14, 2001),
reprinted in COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 48-49.
242. Id.
243. Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defense
Policy, EUR. PARL. Doc. (PE 302.047) 11 (2001), available at http://www.europari.eu.int/
meetdocs/committees/afet/20011008/441968en.pdf.
244. See Remarks by Colin Powell, supra note 111.
245. Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, Statement at the Knesset Session (May 30, 2001)
available at http://www.pmo.gov.il/english/ts.exe?tsurl=0.41.2299.0.0; Prime Minister Ariel
Sharon, Statement (May 22, 2001) (available at http://www.pmo.gov/il/englishl
ts.exe?tsurl=0.41.2185.0.0).
246. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tel-Aviv suicide bombing at the Dolphin disco,
June 1, 2001, at http://www.mfa.gov.il (last visited Mar. 1, 2002).
247. Israel begins burying bombing victims, CNN, June 3, 2001, at http://www.cnn.com/
2001/WORLD/meast/06/03/israel.ceasefire (last visited Mar. 1, 2002).
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Central Intelligence Agency, brokered a ceasefire agreement
based on the central points of the Mitchell Report.248 Despite
these attempts to quell the violence, tensions have escalated in the
months that followed. Nevertheless, both sides continued to
publicly emphasize their continued commitment to the Mitchell
Report and to the Tenet workplan. For months after their
publication, these two documents were the only peacekeeping
guidelines accepted by the parties and the international
community. 2
49
VII. RELEVANCE FOR THE PEACE PROCESS AND
CONFLICT RESOLUTION
In most ways, the experience and results in forming a fact-
finding committee regarding the violence in the Middle East were
far from successful. As detailed above, the primary goal of the
October 2000 Sharm el-Sheikh Summit was to implement a cease-
fire, however, violence continued and evolved for months. 250 The
Committee also failed in nearly all of the other terms of
cooperation set forth in the agreed Presidential Statement. 251 In
fact, the only term that took force was the formation of the
Mitchell Committee.252 The Committee's original goals were an
introspective attempt to analyze the recent violence and to find a
solution to prevent its recurrence. 253 When it became readily
apparent that the violence would continue, the Committee and the
parties involved realized that an immediate end to the violence
was now their paramount objective. 254
From a purely legal standpoint, in terms of fact-finding, this
material change in circumstances might have warranted a stop to
the work of the Committee in that the terms and agenda set out
and agreed upon between the parties had markedly changed. It is
doubtful whether Israel would have agreed to such a mandate at
the outset. At the same time, Israel made a conscious decision to
continue its involvement with the Committee, perhaps to avoid
248. A Plan to Curtail Violence, HA'ARETZ (English Edition), June 14,2001.
249. S.C. Res. 1397, U.N. SCOR, 4489th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1397 (2002).
250. See COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 4.
251. See id. at 7.
252. See id. at 42.
253. White House Press Release, supra note 9.
254. Letter from the members of the Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee to
Colin Powell, Secretary of State, United States Department of State, supra note 223, at 46.
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being perceived in the international community as the party that
rejected a potential solution to the conflict.
255
From the Palestinian perspective, the goal of
internationalizing the conflict and the search for negotiating
forums outside the "Oslo agreements" were equally attainable by
conciliation as by fact-finding. The Palestinians had not achieved
any tangible diplomatic gain from the months of violence and held
out hope that the Mitchell Committee would offer it some sort of
diplomatic victory. Therefore, despite the material changes, the
parties continued their cooperation. This tacit agreement officially
changed the essence of the mission from one of fact-finding to one
of conciliation.
In its desire to reach a politically viable solution, the
Committee avoided certain facts and determinations. The
Committee instead emphasized solutions that would allow both
sides to either willingly or reluctantly accept its terms. While the
Committee achieved that goal, it alone did not create the
necessary leverage to induce the sides into carrying out the
recommendations of the Report.
While the Report received much respect and was widely
lauded both regionally and internationally, it failed to induce the
parties to end the violence. Despite being widely supported and
the fact that no other viable proposal exists,256 its long-term effect
is unclear. Despite the fact that both sides continue to profess their
"acceptance" of the terms of the Mitchell Report, it is
255. Other considerations may have included Israel's displeasure with the findings of
other independent observers in the region such as Amnesty International and a committee
sent to the region by the Commission on Human Rights, and the concern that a lacuna
created by the dissolution of the Mitchell Committee might breed a stronger and less
favorable diplomatic effort toward internationalization of the conflict. See FIRST
STATEMENT OF ISRAEL, supra note 85, at 118-20. For example, the Palestinians initiated
two discussions in the U.N. Security Council during the time of the work of the Mitchell
Committee, as well as the convening of the Security Council in October 2000 that led to
Resolution 1322. See S.C. Res. 1322, U.N. SCOR, 4205th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1322
(2000). At the same time, significant efforts were made, both by members of the
Committee and its technical staff, to ease Israel's concerns as to the goals and intent of the
Committee. See Ifill Interview with Mitchell, supra note 83.
256. See A. Ben, Israel and PA seen clambering back to dialogue, HA'ARETZ (English
Edition), Apr. 16, 2001, at 1. A joint Egyptian-Jordanian proposal put forward during
April 2001 was quickly accepted by the Palestinians. The Israelis, however, did not take
part in the drafting of the proposal and its comments on the draft received no response
from either the Jordanians or the Egyptians. ld In June 2001, the Egyptians formally
withdrew the proposal noting that the internationally accepted model for ending the
violence and returning the sides to negotiations was the Mitchell Report.
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questionable that there is either the political will or the proper
environment conducive to implementing the terms of the Report.
In fact, the violence continued for months after the publication of
the Report. As with any other fact-finding committee, the
acceptance of its findings ultimately depends on the interests of
the sides. While those interests may come in time, and the method
may in fact be laid out in the Mitchell Report, it was certainly not
the strength or influence of the legal mechanism of fact-finding or
conciliation that will influence the parties.
It is unclear that either "fact-finding" or conciliation is the
focus of the parties today. Even the terms of the Mitchell Report
may not have true support from the parties. The Palestinians,
interested at the beginning of the process, and certainly continue
to have a strategic interest in increased international involvement,
it is not clear that they have an interest in paying a price, such as
returning to negotiations under the original conditions of the Oslo
peace process that may be required by truly adapting the findings
of the Mitchell Committee. 257 Perhaps the continuing discussions
regarding the use of international observers258 to enforce the
Report, despite the express findings of the Committee, are an
effort to disregard the findings, freeing the Palestinians to continue
to search for a more favorable forum. 259  Israel, though
uninterested in the mission at its inception, now has a stake in
requiring an implementation of the cease-fire. Some in Israel,
257. COMMiTIEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 69.
258. A statement of the participants at the Meeting of G-8 Foreign Ministers on July
18-19, 2001, regarding the situation in the Middle East, concluded: "We believe that in
these circumstances third-party monitoring accepted by both parties would serve their
interests in implementing the Mitchell Report." G-8 Foreign Ministers' Statement on the
Middle East, at http://www.usinfo.state/govlecon/group8/summitOl/wwwhl97Ola.html
(last visited Apr. 13, 2002). During August and December 2001, the United Nations
Security Council dealt yet again with this issue, at the request of the Palestinians. To the
disappointment of the Palestinians, no resolution was reached by the Security Council.
259. This search would continue at a variety of fora in the second half of 2001 and into
2002. Some prominent examples include the World Conference Against Racism in
Durban, South Africa in early September 2001; the Conference of High Contracting Parties
to the Forth Geneva Convention in Geneva on December 5, 2001 and the reconvening of
the 10th Emergency Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York on
December 20, 2001. In the latter, the Palestinians presented a proposal to pursue another
new track-the request of an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on
questions regarding Israel's actions in the territories. In the Resolution that passed at the
General Assembly, this proposal was removed. See U.N. Doc. A/RES/ES-10/9. Despite
this Palestinian strategy, when the Security Council eventually approved a U.S. brokered
Resolution regarding the conflict, it supported the Mitchell Report. See S.C. Res. 1397,
U.N. SCOR, 4489 th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1397 (2002).
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however, may also be less interested in the price it may have to
pay, domestically, for a settlement freeze. This point is yet to be
tested, and it remains dependent upon a true cessation of violence
by the Palestinian side.
Most states are unwilling to adopt fact-finding measures for
comparatively mundane issues.260 In fact, there is no successful
precedent in recent history for a use of fact-finding or a
conciliation commission in a case of such existential importance as
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.261 It is possible that the Mitchell
Committee may contribute to the negotiation process that would
ultimately end violence between the parties. This will happen
when both sides are ready to not only hear proposals, but also to
make difficult compromises. The fact-finding element of the
Mitchell Committee, however, did not achieve this result. Rather,
local concerns and decision making prodded by international
pressure, could one day reach this goal without a fancy "blue
ribbon panel."
Thus, while the Report was an earnest effort by the
individuals who seemed interested in bringing this chapter of
violence between the Israelis and the Palestinians to an end, it is
doubtful that the Report served as a turning point in the conflict. It
was unlikely that it had the possibility of doing so in the first place.
Other attempts to inject an international presence, such as
observers or monitors, will have a similar fate. Ultimately, for a
breakthrough to occur, the political and popular leadership within
the Israeli and the Palestinian communities must demonstrate a
desire to support a non-violent breakthrough that will demand an
openness to co-exist. External intervention efforts, such as the
Mitchell Committee, cannot serve as a replacement for local
decisions and actions of dialogue and peacemaking between the
sides.
260. See BAR-YAACOV, supra note 21, at 1.
261. Nevertheless, on April 19, 2002, the Security Council unanimously approved "an
initiative of the Secretary General to develop accurate information regarding recent
events in the Jenin refugee camp through a fact-finding team." S.C. Res. 1405, U.N.
SCOR, 4516th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1405 (2002). This team never was able to achieve
agreement about its mandate and was disbanded by the Secretary General on May 1, 2002.
See Letter from Secretary General Kofi A. Annan to Kishore Mahbubani, President of the
Security Council, May 1, 2002.
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